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During an oral argument in a recent dispute about the constitutionality of 
critical provisions of the Voting Rights Act, Justice Antonin Scalia 
controversially announced that he was concerned about the “perpetuation of racial 
entitlements.”1  He explained, “[w]henever a society adopts racial entitlements, it 
is very difficult to get out of them through the normal political processes.”2  Much 
of the subsequent uproar was directed at Justice Scalia’s linking of the Voting 
Rights Act with a racial entitlement.  But what is perhaps more interesting from 
the perspective constitutional law is the conception of the operation of politics 
that animated his assertions.
3
  Presumably, if racial entitlements could be 
overturned through the normal political process, it would not be appropriate for 
the Court to intervene.  But for Justice Scalia, in the normal political process that 
exists, there is nothing “to be gained by any [congressperson] to vote against 
continuation of this act.”4  As a result, “[the Act] will be reenacted in perpetuity 
unless … a court can say it does not comport with the Constitution.”5 
The normal political process that seems to exists in Justice Scalia’s mind 
is one in which those who stand to gain from civil rights legislation are politically 
influential while those who stand to lose are politically impotent.  It is the racial 
minorities who are politically powerful and the members of the white majority 
who are politically weak.  While a great deal of attention has been directed at 
Justice Scalia’s statement in oral argument, it wasn’t the first time that 
conservative members of the Court proffered such a conception of politics when 
interpreting civil rights statutes and the Constitution.  For example, three years 
earlier in Ricci v. DeStefano, the three more conservative members of the Court, 
Justices Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Scalia, suggested that politicians 
representing the city of New Haven withdrew a test that would have denied 
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promotion opportunities for all but a few racial minority firefighters pursuant to 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
6
  The conservative justices surmised after an 
analysis of the process of adoption of the state action that the reason for the 
withdrawal of the test was the New Haven politicians’ “desire to please a 
politically important racial constituency.”7  Thirteen years before that in Romer v. 
Evans, Justices Scalia, William Rehnquist, and Clarence Thomas writing in 
dissent, argued that a Colorado statewide initiative invalidating local ordinances 
protecting individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
should have been upheld.  For the dissenters, the initiative represented “a modest 
attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores 
against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through 
the use of the laws.”8 
Many would argue that this conception of politics in which minorities are 
politically powerful and members of the majority are politically weak has it 
entirely backwards.  These opponents of the conservative jurisprudence could 
point to the history of subordination of racial and other minorities and the long-
standing pluralist theoretical framework that suggests these groups are vulnerable 
to politically marginalization.
9
  Proponents of the conservative jurisprudence, 
however, could point to minority gains over the past half-century as represented 
in the democratic victories of civil rights statute and a recently emerging public 
choice theoretical framework that suggests organized minorities have a political 
advantage over the diffuse majority in the political process.
10
  Regardless of who 
has the better of this debate in the abstract, I argue in this Essay that the Court 
should be encouraged to follow Justice Scalia’s lead and be open about how they 
think politics operates in the context of the cases being adjudicated. 
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Such openness should be encouraged because conceptions of the operation 
of politics inevitably influence important parts of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence.  For example, a central underlying question in the Supreme Court’s 
equal protection jurisprudence is when should the Court step in to provide special 
protection from the majoritarian process.
11
  This special judicial protection, which 
comes in the form of close scrutiny of democratically adopted laws, is usually 
extended to members of groups who the Court perceives as vulnerable in the 
democratic process.
12
  The determination of who is vulnerable ultimately turns on 
how the Court conceives politics.  Despite the inevitable influence of conception 
of politics on the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, members of the 
Court are not always explicit about the influence of these conceptions on their 
decisions.  For every case in which justices have provided clues about how a 
particular conception of politics influenced their decision to extend or to not 
extend close scrutiny, there are many other cases in which justices have been 
much more opaque.  The Court has justified its decision to subject to strict 
scrutiny laws that benefit racial minorities on the basis of a principle that that the 
Constitution is colorblind.
13
  But lying beneath this rhetoric was an undefined 
concern that “simple racial politics” influenced the democratic adoption of such 
laws.
14
  In addition, the Court’s decisions not to extend special judicial protection 
                                                 
11
 See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 113-14 (1979) (“To be sure, the elderly are not a 
‘discrete and insular minority’ in need of ‘extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.’”); San Antonio Independent School District No. 1 v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) 
(“The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none the traditional indicia of 
suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”).   
12
 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (determining that classifications 
based on alien status “are inherent suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny [because] [a]liens 
are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority’”).  For most members of groups seeking 
special judicial protection, the Court has determined that they are not politically powerless 
apparently because the legislative body has passed laws protective of their interests.  See, e.g., 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985) (holding the mentally disabled 
were not a suspect class in part because they apparently had political power as represented by the 
law passed responsive to their needs); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-55 (1971) (denying 
the claim of poor residents for judicial protection against vote dilution on a similar basis).   
13
 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 747 (2007) (suggesting that the more faithful interpretation of the holding in Brown v. board 
of Education outlawing school segregation was that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents states 
from according differential treatment to American children on the basis of the color of their skin”); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378 (2003) (quoting Justice John Marshall Harlan’s opinion in 
Plessy v. Ferguson that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes 
among citizens”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218 (1995) (“[T]he guarantee 
of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else 
when applied to a person of another color.”).    
14
 See, e.g., Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (describing the function of strict 
 4 
to members of groups like the poor, the aged, and disabled seems to be based on a 
vague notion that they are only occasional and not perpetual losers in the 
majoritarian process.  Finally, the Court has been much more reluctant to defer to 
congressional laws protecting the aged, and the disabled against discrimination 
that provide members of these groups with the right to sue states for violations of 
federal laws.
15
  The Court in its reasoning emphasizes its concern about protecting 
the sovereignty of the state.
16
  But what also seems to animate this jurisprudence 
is a suspicion about the power of these groups to secure laws that provide them 




In other areas of the law, this lack of transparency has created confusion 
about the sources of judicial decision-making, leading many down the path of 
easy critique about judicial willfulness and personal value imposition.  For 
example, the case of Citizens United v. FEC seems fundamentally inconsistent 
with the conservative judicial concern about minority capture of politics in other 
constitutional contexts.  In Citizens United, a conservative majority forced the 
deregulation of independent expenditures on campaigns through the invalidation 
of a federal prohibition on independent corporate and union expenditures for 
electioneering communications.  The Court held the prohibitions on independent 
expenditures violated the First Amendment freedom of speech. For many 
commentators, this was simply another example of conservative justices favoring 
the corporations at the expense of the people.
18
  Commentators predicted (rightly 
perhaps) that as a result of the decision, elections would be awash with corporate 
money and this would further the corporate capture of politics.
19
  This 
conservative decision to overturn the federal campaign finance law therefore 
appears to counter the precepts of public choice theory.  It seems to allow for the 
very minority group control of politics at the expense of the broader, diffuse, and 
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politically weak public – the very political condition that the conservative justices 
seemed to see themselves as fighting against in equal protection context.  But 
looking more closely at the opinion, it is apparent in the reasoning that the 
conservative justices were in fact seeking to follow the theory’s very logic. 
Justice Kennedy, in an opinion that Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Alito 
joined, noted that a federal exemption for speech by Political Action Committees 
(PACs) – organizations that pool campaign money from members and donate the 
funds to campaigns – accompanied the ban on corporate speech.20  The 
conservative plurality explained that it is burdensome to form these PACs and 
expensive to administer them.
21
  As a result, “fewer than 2,000 of the millions of 
corporations in the country have PACs.”22  Only these few corporations can 
engage in electioneering communications in the face of the corporate speech ban.  
The corporate speech ban, therefore, only silenced “certain voices” at particular 
“points in the speech process.”  For the conservatives, the law represented a 
restriction that distinguished between different speakers.  It prohibited the speech 
of the many small corporations without large amounts of wealth and sanctioned 
the speech of their more wealthy corporate counterparts.
23
  This distinction 
between speakers combined with the advantages that wealthy corporations 
already have with respect to lobbying elected officials made the ban especially 
pernicious.  Rather than ban corporate speech, Justice Kennedy explained, the 
way to check corporate factions was “by permitting them all to speak … and by 
entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false.”24   
 Many criticisms can be directed to conservative justices’ justifications for 
invalidating the corporate speech ban and the liberal dissenters provided some of 
them.
25
  But whether it was right or wrong is beside the point.  What is relevant 
here is that the conservative justices’ expressed concerns with the law that are 
very much consistent with those that animated in the cases described above.  They 
appeared to be concerned about a law that they see as advantaging a particular 
subset of corporations at the expense of the broader public.  And while they never 
expressed it explicitly in the opinion, what seemed implicit is a determination that 
the corporate speech ban and the political action committee exemption enabled 
corporate capture of the political process that they sought to ameliorate through a 
deregulation of campaign speech.    
Given the oft-vague prescriptions of the law, and particularly the 
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Constitution, combined with the fact that judges are human, it is simply not 
feasible for members of the Court to not be influenced by conceptions of how the 
world works or should work in their decisions.  If conceptions of politics 
inevitably influence the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, these 
conceptions should be subject to the adversarial process and broader democratic 
engagement to both avoid judicial error and maintain judicial legitimacy.  This is 
the real lesson of the infamous Lochner era that scholars have mostly overlooked. 
In this era, an implicit laissez faire conception of the economy seemed to have 
influenced the widespread judicial invalidation of state and federal regulations 
pursuant to a right to contract found in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause.
26
  The reaction to the Lochner era by scholars and judges alike has been 
that the Court should not be influenced in its decisions by theoretical conceptions 
about how the world works.  The Court should just instead apply the law.  This 
reaction has led to a post-Lochner era jurisprudence in which the justices try to 
hide the ball on how conceptions of how the world operates influence their 
decisions.  This judicial opaqueness leads to a corresponding public outcry about 
inadequately supported judicial determinations and unpersuasive judicial 
reconciliations of doctrinal inconsistencies.        
The problem with the Court’s Lochner era jurisprudence was not that 
conceptions of how the world works influenced judicial decision-making.  
Instead, the mistake was that members of the Court never clearly publicized how 
these conceptions influenced their decisions.  As a result, there was no 
opportunity to contest the laissez faire conception of the economic marketplace 
that seemed to animate the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this era.  This 
ultimately contributed to judicial error, as an out-dated economic philosophy 
could not account for the evolution in economic thinking and social realities.  The 
lack of transparency also undermined judicial legitimacy as a Court unable to 
provide adequate support for its decision in the law or to reconcile precedent was 
left vulnerable to critics who described its motivation in purely partisan terms.  
The lesson from the mistakes of the Lochner era is not that justices should 
do the impossible and cabin their conceptions of how the world works off from its 
decisions.  Instead, Court should be open about what conceptions of the world are 
influencing its decisions.  For example, in the Court’s civil rights jurisprudence, 
this means that justices should be open about how conceptions of the operation of 
politics are influencing its determination of when the Court should step in to 
provide special judicial protection for members of groups from the majoritarian 
process and when it should not.  The opportunity for adversarial engagement in 
the courts and broader democratic engagement outside the courts about how 
conceptions of the operation of politics will reduce judicial error.  It will provide 
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members of the Court with the opportunity to examine evidence and engage 
arguments about how politics operates rather than rely on unquestioned 
theoretically based impressions.  In addition, and perhaps counter-intuitively, 
judicial transparency about the influence of conceptions of politics on its 
decisions will increase the legitimacy of the Court.  While such transparency will 
incur the cost of eliminating the public veneer of an apolitical Court merely 
applying the law, these costs would be overcome by the legitimacy gains from 
doctrinal coherence.      
In the civil rights context, scholars and litigants can encourage judicial 
transparency about the influence of conceptions of how politics operates on its 
jurisprudence.  Scholars can do so by focusing less on criticizing the Court for 
being influenced by such conceptions.  Instead, scholars should recognize the 
inevitability of these conceptual influences and continue to develop theories 
explaining how doctrine has developed in accord with these influences.  Then 
rather than de-legitimizing the Court for doing what is inevitable, scholars should 
be willing to make the case for or against the particular conception that the Court 
has adopted.  This would require that scholars engage in the inter-disciplinary 
enterprise and draw on the social sciences and empirical work to inform their case 
for how the world actually works.  Civil rights litigants can encourage judicial 
transparency by anticipating in advance the influence of conceptions of politics on 
judicial decision-making.  Through trial and appellate briefs that engage the 
discussion about how politics operated in the context of the relevant democratic 
decision, the Court can be forced to be transparent about their agreement or 
disagreement with the conception being proffered.    
 
 
